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The Fiscal Burden of the Legacy of the Civil 





This paper estimates the fiscal burden of the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) civil service pension 
systems that were closed in 2008 to new members in North Cyprus. At that time, a new pension 
system  was  introduced  for  the  newly  hired  government  employees  and  new  private  sector 
workers. Estimates are made of the difference between the present values of future contributions 
and the pension benefits. This approach measures the government‟s net liabilities related to the 
accruals of the pension rights received by the individuals covered through these plans for the 
period from 2009 to the death of the last member in the system.  The estimated unfunded cost of 
these civil service pension plans is 7.3 billion euros or 276% of GDP. This amount of implicit 
debt is significantly higher than 5.8 billion euros that has been estimated as the amount of cash 
compensation for land and property that would need to be paid in order to reach an agreement for 
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The Fiscal Burden of the Legacy of the Civil 
Service Pension Systems in Northern Cyprus 
 
1 Introduction 
Civil  servant  pension  obligations  have  become  a  serious  fiscal  problem  for  many  European 
countries in recent years (Gokhale, 2009). Generous promises have been made by governments 
to avoid paying higher salaries immediately or to buy peace from public sector unions.  
High replacement rates, low retirement ages, generous PAYGO provisions and especially 
demographic  changes  appear  to  be  the  main  reasons  for  the  significant  burden  on  future 
government budgets, and ultimately for taxpayers (Oksanen, 2004). For instance, for the OECD 
countries less than 25% of the civil service pension schemes have any accumulated reserves. As 
a result, these countries are now spending an average of nearly 2% of GDP on pensions for civil 
servants  and  other  public-sector  employees.  In  the  1990s,  central-government  employment 
decreased relative to the population by a full percentage point in both developing and OECD 
countries. In developing countries, although the growth in the size of civil service slowed down 
or  even  stopped,  the  amount  paid  for  public-sector  employees‟  pension  benefits  has  often 
increased continuously because of the long lag in time between the reduction in the number of 
active employees  and  the decline in  the number of  retired civil  servants  together with  their 
survivors (Palacios and Whitehouse, 2006). 
The average spending just on civil-service pensions is around 1.2 % of GDP for OECD 
and around 1.33% of GDP for non-OECD countries. A better indicator of the fiscal pressure of 
civil-service pension spending on the budget is the ratio of pension spending to government 
revenues. For OECD countries this ratio is 5%, whereas for the non-OECD countries it is 6% 
(Palacios and Whitehouse, 2006). 
In 1995, prior to implementing pension reforms, it was estimated that the implicit debt of 
the  public  sector  pension  systems  amounted  to  102%  of  GDP  in  France,  109%  of  GDP  in 
Portugal and 132% of GDP in Sweden (Disney, 2000).  
In the US, the greatest fiscal problem is created by the defined benefit pension plans of 
state and local  governments. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) estimate the present value of the 
unfunded  deficit  in  2009  of  these  government  pension  plans  to  be  approximately  3  trillion 
dollars. 4 
 
Although  the  attempts  to  reform  the  public  sector  pension  systems  have  faced  great 
resistance and resulted in massive strikes, especially in Greece and France, the determination of 
the EU countries to solve this problem demonstrates the severity of the issue (Featherstone, 
2005). North Cyprus faces a similar funding crisis in its public sector sponsored pension funds. 
This study will show that its options for reform are severely limited. 
 
2 The North Cyprus Situation 
In North Cyprus, the historical evolutions of the pension systems and the political forces at play 
have resulted in a large civil service relative to the size of its population, and a very generous 
defined benefit public sector pension system. Prior to 1974 Turkish Cypriots were largely shut 
out of influential public sector positions. This changed after 1974 with the area‟s separation from 
South Cyprus, hence, opening up  full range of positions in the Turkish Cypriot  government 
administration
1. The implicit guarantee of financial support to the budget from T urkey made 
public sector employment a highly sought after  career by most  Turkish Cypriots.  The public 
sector turned into a “protected” sector in the economy‟s labor market with higher than market 
wages and the ultimate in job security. With competition for private sector employment coming 
from immigrants from Turkey, a depression of wage rates would have caused a pressure for 
Turkish Cypriots to move away to the UK and elsewhere. Hence, public sector employment with 
higher  salaries  and  generous  pension  benefits  became  an  effective  instrument  to  retain 
indigenous Turkish Cypriot population on the Island. 
Thus, a low statutory retirement age with generous pension replacement rates and loose 
eligibility rules increased the incentive for people to seek public sector employment and hence 
the number of people eligible for pensions.   
Also, the amalgamation of factors like the attempts to unify the island with the further EU 
membership and current fiscal reforms taking place in Turkey has contributed to the 2008 civil 
service pension reform in North Cyprus. A more complete analysis of this reform is the subject 
of another paper.  
                                                             
1 Prior to 1974 there was a long civil war in Cyprus stretching from at least 1963. After the division of Cyprus in 
1974,  the  defenders  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot  villages  were  compensated  for  their  efforts  with  civil  service  jobs 
accompanied by generous accrued pension rights for their military service during the wartime years. 5 
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the fiscal legacy of the civil service pensions 
system that is operative for all those employed or pensioned by the government prior to 2008. 
The magnitude of the unfunded pension liabilities of the retired civil servants and of those hired 
before 2008 and those still working will have an important bearing on the public sector budgets 
of the future United Cyprus. Alternatively, if North Cyprus remains as a separate entity, the 
magnitude of these unfunded liabilities will be a major factor to determine the fiscal viability of 
North Cyprus without budgetary transfers from Turkey.   
  
3 The Structure of Civil Service Pensions System (for employees hired prior to 2008) in 
North Cyprus 
In North Cyprus the civil service pension system prior to 2008 consisted of two defined benefit 
pension funds. They were separate from the government sponsored social security system for 
private employees. The first plan includes those workers who started their employment in the 
public sector prior to July 1, 1987. It is financed entirely through the government budget. The 
second fund is for the government workers who entered into employment after July 1, 1987. The 
latter is partially financed by the contributions of its members. It was initially designed to be 
independent on the government budget, but the contributions have not kept pace with the accrued 
pension liabilities. In 2009, both of these plans were closed to new employees and a new pension 
plan was designed for the new government employees and new private sector workers.  
In 2009, the civil service pensions system as a whole included 11,000 contributors and 
11,813 retirees. This group represents about 20% of the total working population or about 8% of 
the total population of North Cyprus. Presently working male civil servants who were employed 
before 1987 contribute only 3.5% of their gross wages for the survivor retirement benefits for 
their wives and children. These workers make no direct contribution to the funding for their own 
pension benefits. Workers employed between 1987 and 1997; however, contribute 4% (women) 
and 8% (men) of their gross salaries to their pension system. In 1997, these rates increased to 5% 
and 9%, respectively. 
New recruits to the civil service of North Cyprus enter into employment at an average 
age of 25 years old. The eligibility requirements for full pension benefit mandate a minimum of 
25 years of service and a minimum of 55 years of age. The mandatory retirement age is 60. 
These  retirement  ages  for  civil  servants  are  lower  than  for  EU  countries,  where  the  normal 6 
 
retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for women. Even France which has traditionally had a low 
retirement age has recently increased it from 60 to 62.5% (Bennhold, 2010).  
In North Cyprus, every civil  servant  with  30  years of work experience is eligible to 
receive a pension based on a defined benefit formula that will give the person a replacement rate 
of 55.79%
2 of their last working month‟s salary. In addition, they are entitled to a lump sum 
gratuity payment at the point of retirement equal to the person‟s last monthly salary times the 
years  of  service.  This  gratuity  payment  has  a  value  equal  to  an  additional  pension  with  a 
replacement rate of 13.95%
3. These two benefits make up a total replacement rate of about 70% 
of the final year‟s income. Since pension benefits are not subject to income tax in North Cyprus, 
this rate is a net replacement rate (NNR). If the average tax rate of a pensioner is 20%, then a 
70%  net  replacement  rate  is  equal  to  a  gross  replacement  rate  (GRR)  of  87.5%
4.  This is 
significantly higher than the 34 OECD countries‟ average gross pension replacement rate (for 
workers with average earnings) of 58.7% (OECD, 2007).  
Another benefit is the pension provision for payments to be made to surviving widows. 
Women receive 50% of the husband‟s pension benefits after his death, even if the husband has 
not yet retired. The opposite does not hold for male spouses, who enjoy no survival benefits from 
the wife‟s employment unless she makes a special contribution. Our data show that almost no 
women (less than 100 out of a total of 4,591) are paying for the survival benefits that will be 
enjoyed by their husbands. From the life tables for Cyprus (World Health Organization, 2011) 
we learn that when evaluated at age 25 (the average  age when men are hired into the civil 
service) Cypriot women are expected to live on average 4 years longer than men. In addition, 
historical cultural practices have resulted in wives being on average 5 years younger than their 
husbands. We have carried out an actuarial estimation of the value of this benefit, considering 
both the probabilities of the husbands dying each year after 25 years of age and that the wife 
(five years younger) is still surviving. In addition we consider the expected life of the wife as of 
                                                             
2 The basic replacement rate of 55.79% is calculated by multiplying the years of service (an average of 30 years in 
our analysis) with 12 (the number of months in a year) times 0.00155 (a pre-determined constant number). Those 
who would like to work more than 30 years and receive higher replacement rates are subject to higher monthly 
contribution rates. 
3 Both the lump sum gratuity payment and the initial level of the monthly pension benefits are based on the value of 
the person‟s salary during the last year of employment. Hence, the additional replacement rate of 13.95% for the 
gratuity can be calculated by comparing the value of the gratuity to the present value at the point of retirement of the 
cost of funding the basic pension plan with a replacement of 55.79%.  
4 NRR = GRR * (1-t), GRR = NRR/(1-t), GRR = 70%/(1-20%) = 87.5% 7 
 
that point in time. The value of this additional spousal survivor benefit that is assigned to every 
male is estimated to be equal to the normal annual pension received by male civil servants for an 
additional 7 years beyond their expected life.   
4 Estimation of the Fiscal Burden of the Civil Service Pensions System 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the cost of the civil service pensions system as of 2009.  
Table 1: Parameter Values for the Base Case Analysis (all 2009 figures) 
Number of contributors TOTAL:  11,000 
                                                   Women:  4,591 
                                                     Men:    6,409 
Number of pensioners TOTAL:      11,813 
                                                   Women:  4,231 
                                                     Men:    7,582 
Retirement age:    55 
At 55, expected life expectancy:    25.9 for men, 29.3 for women 
Replacement rate:      55.79% 
Discount rate:          3% 
Average number of years worked:       (Retirement Age – 25) 
Widow compensation:        50% of the husband‟s last salary 
Widow survivor benefit:        Equal to 7 additional years of husband‟s normal 
pension benefit. 
Change in rate of contributions (base case):    0% 
Growth rate in real value of pension benefits (base case):  0% 
Growth rate of real wages (base case):      3.75% for men, 4.00% for women
5 
Growth rate of GDP (base case):    4.61% (average of last 32 years) 
Growth rate of Tax revenues (base case):    4.61% (same as GDP growth rate) 
                                                             
5 In our econometric estimation of the age-earnings profile of the labor force in North Cyprus we find that the 
growth in real wages per year for those employed from ages 20 to 60 attributable to age alone is 1.75% per year for 
men and 2.00% for women. In addition, in the base case we add a real increase of wages of 2% to these seniority 
factors. Hence, the members of the labor force in the civil service pension system can expect on average to earn 
3.75% more each year if they are a man and 4.00% more each year if they are a woman. Because high seniority 
people retire with high wages and people enter the civil service at relatively young age with lower wages, the overall 
wage bill will rise by approximately 2 percent. 8 
 
EURO / TL (2009):   1.94 
 
The annual net cost and the present value of the future costs are made for the period from 
2009 to the date that the last person in the system is expected to die. Using the parameter values 
presented in Table 1 for the base case, the fiscal burden of the existing civil service pensions 
system is estimated.  
Our analysis consists of three components. First, an estimation of the present value of the 
cost  of  the  future  pensions  payments  received  by  public  servants  who  have  already  retired 
(existing pensioners) is made. Second, the net cost is estimated, in present value terms, of the 
pensions  that  will  be  paid  to  those  currently  working.  The  net  fiscal  burden  of  the  latter 
component is the difference between the present value of the future contributions made by civil 
servants minus the present value of the future pension benefits they are entitled to receive. The 
third component is the present value of the cost of the gratuity payments to those who are still 
working and will be paid out in future in the form of a lump sum payment when they retire. 
 To derive the cost of the future pension payments by those currently retired, the first task 
is to determine the number of years each person is expected to live, given their current age. This 
number is calculated individually for each of the 11,813 retired individuals.  This number is 
derived from the life tables for Cyprus where the expected life of each individual (men and 
women  separately)  is  estimated,  given  their  current  age
6. Subtracting the actual age   of the 
individual from the person‟s expected future life (given their current age in 2009), gives us the 
number of additional years that this retired individual is expected to receive a pension. This 
variable is denoted as (n) in equation 1 below.   
For those already retired, the estimation of the cost of future pension payments starts with 
the actual pension they received in 2009. This variable (P) is then increased each year until the 
expected year of death by the annual real rate of growth of pension (gp) payments. Finally, each 
                                                             
6 The civil servants on Northern Cyprus have higher incomes than the average resident in Northern Cyprus. 
Based  on  evidence  found  in  the  literature,  they  are  expected  to  live  longer  than  the  average  person  in 
Northern Cyprus. At the same time the World Health Organizations Life Tables (2011) are based  on the 
residents of both North and South Cyprus. The residents of South Cyprus make up 80% of the population of 
the Island and have an average per capita income that is approximately 55% higher than that of Northern 
Cyprus. Hence, we feel the WHO life tables for Cyprus will be fairly accurate for the higher income cohorts of 
civil servants in Northern Cyprus we are considering here. 9 
 
of the annual payments is discounted by the rate of discount (r) to 2009. The resulting present 
value  is  the  cost,  evaluated  as  of  2009,  of  the  future  pension  payments  received  by  each 
individual. To find the present value for the entire set of retirees the present values as of 2009 for 
each of the individuals are added together.  This is expressed by the first term of equation 1.  
The second term of Equation 1 is to calculate the cost of pensions paid to widows after 
the death of their husbands. As discussed above, the value of this benefit is equivalent to 
 
 
                      (1)   
 
 
where; P is the annual pension payment, n is the life expectancy after 2009, gp  the annual growth 
rate of pension benefits, r is the discount rate, i is the number of pensioners, s is the number of 
married male pensioners and EP stands for the existing pensioners. 
  The second group of people for which the pension burden should be calculated is made 
up of those individuals who are still working for the government, but belong to one of these two 
old pension plans. The present value of fiscal burden created by the pensions that will be paid to 
those  still  working  less  the  present  value  of  their  contributions  from  2009  to  retirement  is 




   
where; n is the life expectancy after age of retirement, gw is the annual real growth rate of wages, 
gp the annual growth rate of pension benefits, r is the discount rate, R is the retirement age, A is 
the current age in 2009, c is the contribution rate, Wi is the annual wages of contributors and i is 
the index for the number of contributors, , Wu is the annual wages of married male workers and u 
is the index for the number of married male workers, M is the replacement rate and EC stands for 
the existing contributors. 
To estimate this component of the cost of the pension system, we begin with the annual 
contributions made by each of the 11,000 individuals from 2009 until their retirement. The first 
term of equation 2 shows the summation of the discounted value of each civil servant‟s annual 
wage times the corresponding contribution rate. The annual wage is increased by the expected 
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growth in the real wage rates (gw). The negative sign used for this part of the formula is because 
we need to subtract the present value of the contribution inflows from the pension benefits to be 
paid to each person after retirement.  Secondly, the annual pension for each of the currently 
working civil servants is calculated using the replacement rate (M) times the expected real wage 
earned by the individual during the last year before retirement. This wage is estimated by taking 
the individual‟s wage rate in 2009 and adjusting it through time from 2009 until the year of 
retirement (R) by the expected real rate of growth of real wages (gw). Once the individual retires, 
the  annual  pension  benefit  is  then  increased  each  year  by  the  assumed  real  growth  rate  of 
pensions  (gp)  until  each  individual  dies.  When  the  present  value  of  the  estimated  pension 
payments for each contributor is added up and then subtracted from the present value of the 
summation of each person‟s contribution, the net cost of the pension system for the currently 
working civil servants is calculated. Finally, the last term of the equation calculates the expected 
present value of the future payments to the widows who are expected to receive benefits after the 
death of the spouse using the same assumption as employed in equation 1. The present value of 
the cost obtained from this term is added to the net cost calculated from the first two parts to find 
the present value of the fiscal cost that will have to be borne the current level of pensions to 
existing workers. 
The last component of the analysis estimates the present value of the future fiscal cost 
created by the gratuity payments of the working civil servants that come under this scheme. 
These are received at the time of their retirement. Equation 3 below shows how this cost is 
calculated.  
   
  (3) 
 
where; gw is the annual real growth rate of wages, r is the discount rate, R is the retirement age, A 
is the current age in 2009, Wi is the annual wages of contributors and GP stands for the gratuity 
payments. 
Each individual‟s wage (Wi) is estimated at time of their retirement using 2009 wages and 
adjusting them with the expected real annual growth rate in wages (gw). The number of years to 
make such an adjustment is found by subtracting the current age of each worker (A) from the 
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of service years. This gives the gratuity payment  to be received by each individual. Adding 
together the discounted value of the gratuity payments of the working civil servants makes up the 
third component of the fiscal burden of the civil service pensions system.    
 
5 The Results of the Analysis 
Table 2 below shows the present value of the cost (in 2009 prices) of the unfunded liabilities of 
the civil service pensions system in North Cyprus. In our base case estimate, we have used a real 
discount rate of 3%
7.  
To begin with, the present value of the cost of the pensioners is calculated to be  about 
3.31 billion euros while the net fiscal cost of the working individuals in present value terms  is 
estimated to be equal to about 3.22 billion euros. Moving on to the present value of the gratuity 
payments, it can be seen that the  present value of the cost for the working in dividuals is 
estimated as 0.8 billion euros. Combined they give a present value of total cost  of 7.3 billion 
euros which is 321,184 euros per person within the system.  
Table 2: Summary Results of the Baseline Scenario  
(euros, 2009 price level) 
      Before Adjustment  After Adjustment 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
(1)  PV cost of the gratuity payment (PVGP)  794,433,958  794,433,958 
(2)  PV cost of the existing contributors (PVEC)  3,438,941,635  3,215,410,429 
(3)  PV cost of the existing pensioners (PVEP)   3,469,263,930  3,313,147,053 
(4)  PV TOTAL COST (PVT)  7,702,639,523  7,322,991,440 
(5)  PV cost per person in the system (PVPP)  337,835  321,184 
(6)  PV TOTAL COST / GDP  290%  276% 
  
There are two adjustments that we needed to make to the estimations using equations 1 to 
3 as reported in Table 2 column 2. The first adjustment arises because not all of the civil servants 
will survive until the age of retirement.  For these individuals, the pension system will have 
                                                             
7 The appropriate discount rate for evaluating the funding requirements of pension plans is a topic of considerable 
debate. Real rates of discount in the range of 2% (Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006) to 4% (Brown, Clark and Rauh, 
2011) appear to be appropriate for this situation. Hence, we employed a real rate of discount of 3% is used in our 
base case estimates with a sensitivity analysis conducted using real rates of discount of 2% and 4%. The average 
nominal interest rate paid on Euro zone long-term bonds in August 2010 (European Central Bank, 2011) was 4 
percent, yielding a real rate of approximately 2% net of inflation in 2010.   
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savings in the own pension benefits they would have claimed, but at the same time there will be 
a loss of contributions between the time of death and the date of normal retirement. In the case of 
these historical civil service pension systems the present value of contributions is equal only to 
8% of pension benefits so we simply apply the adjustment to the deficit numbers present in Table 
2, column 2, row 2. In terms of the gratuity, the death benefits are given on the assumption that 
the person has worked 20 years even if the person dies after working less than 20 years and the 
payment is made immediately. Normally the gratuity is received only when the person reaches 
an age of 55. Hence, we make no adjustment to our base estimate of the cost of the gratuity 
payments,  Table 2 column  2, row  1. Our estimate of the overstatement  of the value of the 
pension deficits (based on the probabilities of a civil servant dying each year from age 25 to 55) 
for the base case (gw = 3.75% and 4.0%, and gp = 0%, retirement age 55) is 2% of the values in 
Table 2, column 2, row 2.  
 The second adjustment is required to reflect the fact that for the people who do live to 
the age of retirement they will not all live exactly to their average life expectancy (evaluated at 
the age of retirement) but there will be a distribution of ages of death with a mean equal to the 
expected age of death at retirement.  Because future pension benefits are discounted, and also the 
real value of the pension benefits might be adjusted upward or downward over time then the 
present  value  of  the  pension  benefits  whose  end  periods  are  distributed  over  time  will  be 
different than the present value under the assumption that all deaths occur at exactly the expected 
age of death. With the base case assumptions the present value of the cost of the pension benefits 
for those who are retiring in the future (Table 2, column 2, row 2) are overstated by a further 
4.5%.   
This  means  that  we  need  to  reduce  the  estimated  cost  of  the  pension  benefits  for 
contributors in Table 2 column 2, row 2 by  6.5%, and the cost estimates for the currently retired 
individuals that are reported in Table 2 column 2, row 3 by 4.5%. These adjusted values are 
presented in Table 2 column 3.  
This debt is being rolled over to future generations. Clearly the government of North 
Cyprus is faced with an enormous fiscal challenge in the near and medium terms as the present 
value of the liability arising from the closed civil service pension plan is about 278% of its 13 
 
annual GDP. This figure is significantly higher than the corresponding figures for any of the EU 
countries. 
According  to  OECD  findings  (Mylonas  and  Maisonneuve,  1999),  Greece‟s  PAYGO 
system‟s unfunded liabilities are among the highest in OECD countries. In 1998, the estimated 
present value of the deficit of the future pension liabilities for Greece, calculated for in the same 
way as was done for North Cyprus, was in the order of 200% of GDP. However, this deficit 
included not only the deficit for the civil service pension system, but also for all publically 
managed pensions for the private sector as well. The comparison with Greece shows the severity 
of the situation in North Cyprus. Compared with the Euro zone countries with an average present 
value of pension‟s deficit equal to 50.6% of GDP, it is evident that the unfunded liabilities of the 
pension  system  of  North  Cyprus  are  likely  to  cause  more  serious  problems  for  government 
budget makers in the long run than elsewhere in Europe. 
  Over  a  number  of  years,  intensive  negotiations  have  been  taking  place  amongst  the 
political leaders on how an integration of North Cyprus might be carried out with the Republic of 
Cyprus that would ultimately allow it to enter into the European Union with full legal rights. The 
issues of land and property have dominated these discussions. Many efforts have been made to 
estimate the nature and the value of the compensation  to  the Greek Cypriots  that would be 
needed in order to obtain a resolution to the political conflict. A recent effort to arrive at an 
estimate of the amount of monetary compensation required, after territorial  adjustments,  has 
determined the amount to be 5.8 billion euros
8. Although our estimate of 7.3 billion euros as the 
cost of the unfunded liability of only the civil service pensions of North Cyprus is  25.86 % 
higher than the cash cost of settling the property issue, it is surprising that little or no attention 
has been given to the pension liability issue  in the ongoing negotiations. It seems unlikely that 
North Cyprus or a United Cyprus could bear the fiscal burden of these historical civil service 
pension systems without continued infusion of budgetary support from outside the island. In the 
past, it has been the government of Turkey that had assumed this burden. 
                                                             
8 Çilsal, Kyriacou and Mullen (2010) calculated this amount with the assumption that territorial adjustment would be 
made according to UN Annan Plan. According to their estimate Turkish Cypriot Constituent State will be obliged to 
compensate in cash 480,788,000 square meters of Greek Cypriot land at 12 euros per square meter. This amounted 
to 5.8 billion euros in 2009 prices.   14 
 
It should be noted that these estimates of the financial burden of these pension plans are 
based on the conservative assumptions that GDP will grow at a real rate of 4.61% a year (its 
historical average), where real wage rates are assumed to grow at a real rate of 3.75% for men 
and 4.00% for women  a  year. Once  a  person retires, the values of the pension benefits  are 
adjusted nominally by only the rate of inflation. 
 
6 Policy Implications 
The estimates of the size of the civil service pension deficit in present value terms are presented 
in accordance with a series of assumptions made about the growth rate of the real wages, the 
pension benefits and the retirement ages. Various sensitivity analyses have been conducted to 
estimate the changes in these results under alternative values of the assumptions that could also 
occur. 
At  present,  the  retirement  age  is  55  and  Cyprus  experiences  considerable  pressure  from 
various sources, including Turkey, to raise the age of retirement. By assuming the retirement age 
for new retirees is raised to 60 and 65, we obtain the results shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis for Retirement Age 
   PVGP  PVEC  PVEP  PVT  PVPP  PVT/GDP 
55  794,433,958  3,215,410,429  3,313,147,053  7,322,991,440  321,184  276% 
60  986,576,873  2,999,213,297  3,313,147,053  7,298,937,223  320,129  275% 
65  1,175,461,794  2,639,109,623  3,313,147,053  7,127,718,470  312,619  268% 
 
It is interesting to note that an increase in the retirement age from 55 to 65 actually 
increases the present value of the fiscal burden of the gratuity payments by 47.96%. However, 
the overall decrease of the present value of the cost of future annual pension payments to be paid 
to the existing working contributors dominates and the total impact, in 2009 values, is a net 
2.82% decrease in the total cost from 7.3 billion to 7.1 billion euros and hence a fall in the ratio 
of present value of this pension liability to GDP from 276% to 268%. For the increase in the 
retirement age to 60 years, the impact is very small. However, because of the offsetting effects of 
the two components of the pension schemes, the increase in retirement age to 60 or 65 is not as 
effective  as  it  otherwise  would  be  in  solving  the  budgetary  crises  created  by  these  pension 
commitments. 15 
 
      The next scenario considers the effect of change in the replacement rate on new retirees. 
The impact of changing replacement rates on the budget and the share of GDP used to pay 
defined  benefit  PAYGO  pensions  has  been  extensively  studied  by  Oksanen  (2005).  This 
evaluation  was  undertaken  in  the  context  of  analyzing  a  series  of  pension  reform  options. 
Alternatively,  in  a  budgetary  crisis  similar  to  the  one  that  Hungary,  Poland  and  the  Czech 
Republic faced in the 1990‟s, the replacement rates for new retirees might be unilaterally cut 
(Muller, 2002). Currently, (in 2009) the replacement rate for the basic pension is 55.79% of last 
monthly salary. If this ratio was to be decreased, its impact on the fiscal burden would be as 
follows (see Table 4).  
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis for Replacement Rate 
   PVGP  PVEC  PVEP  PVT  PVPP  PVT/GDP 
55.79%  794,433,958  3,215,410,429  3,313,147,053  7,322,991,440  321,184  276% 
53.00%  794,433,958  3,040,394,414  3,313,147,053  7,147,975,426  313,508  269% 
50.00%  794,433,958  2,852,205,151  3,313,147,053  6,959,786,163  305,254  262% 
47.00%  794,433,958  2,664,015,888  3,313,147,053  6,771,596,900  297,000  255% 
44.00%  794,433,958  2,475,826,626  3,313,147,053  6,583,407,637  288,746  248% 
41.00%  794,433,958  2,287,637,363  3,313,147,053  6,395,218,374  280,492  241% 
 
Such a substantial decrease in the replacement rate would affect only the present value of 
the cost of pensions to be paid to the existing employees upon retirement. A replacement rate of 
41% instead of 55.79% would decrease the total burden of the system from 7.3 billion euros to 
6.4 billion euros. With such a radical decrease in the replacement rate, the present value of civil 
servant pension liability to GDP ratio would fall from 276% to 241% of GDP. 
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis for Different Discount Rates 
   PVGP  PVEC  PVEP  PVT  PVPP  PVT/GDP 
4.00%  685,411,932  2,376,672,076  2,947,599,694  6,009,683,701  263,583  226% 
3.50%  737,290,983  2,759,918,783  3,122,131,293  6,619,341,059  290,322  249% 
3.00%  794,433,958  3,215,410,429  3,313,147,053  7,322,991,440  321,184  276% 
2.50%  857,469,456  3,758,659,880  3,522,645,361  8,138,774,697  356,964  306% 
2.00%  927,110,375  4,408,878,304  3,752,909,264  9,088,897,943  398,636  342% 
 
The discount rate plays an important role in estimating the present value of the deficit. In 
the base case scenario, a real discount rate of 3% is used. In addition, a sensitivity analysis for 
the impact of changes of this variable is carried out for a range of real rates from 2% to 4%. The 16 
 
estimated projections show a range for the present value of the civil servants pension liability 
from 226% of GDP in the case of a 4% discount rate, to 342% in the case of a 2% discount rate. 
In the latter case the estimate of the total value of unfunded pension liabilities now equals to 9.1 
billion euros
9. 
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis for Growth Rate in Real Wages 
Men  Women  PVGP  PVEC  PVEP  PVT  PVPP  PVT/GDP 
4.75%  5.00%  924,516,187  3,791,062,077  3,313,147,053  8,028,725,317  352,137  302% 
3.75%  4.00%  794,433,958  3,215,410,429  3,313,147,053  7,322,991,440  321,184  276% 
2.75%  3.00%  685,277,440  2,737,119,395  3,313,147,053  6,735,543,888  295,419  254% 
1.75%  2.00%  593,457,614  2,338,791,951  3,313,147,053  6,245,396,618  273,921  235% 
 
Table 6 above shows the impact of the growth rate of real wages for the employed civil 
servants on the overall cost of the existing pension system. It can be seen that if wages are 
increased only by the rate of inflation and for seniority increments, then the total pension cost to 
GDP ratio is reduced to 235% (Table 6, row 4) from the base case of 276%.  If the increase in 
wages is greater at 4.75% for women and 5.0% for men, then the per person cost is 352,137 
euros with a total cost to GDP ratio of 302%.  These high values are close to the historical 
experience of real wage growth for the civil service of North Cyprus. These findings reveal that 
one of the most important factors affecting the unfunded liabilities burden on the budget is the 
real growth rate in wages of the currently employed civil servants. 
Another sensitivity test has been conducted to find out the fiscal impact of the real rate of 







                                                             
9 Changing the discount rate has implications for the values of two adjustments discussed above. For discount 
rates of 2, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5 and 4 percent, the  downward adjustment of 2% remains  constant for the deaths 
occurring  prior  to  retirement.  However,  the  additional  downward  adjustments  to  the  costs  due  to  the 
distribution of age of death after retirement are 3.5, 4.0, 4.5, 5.0, and 5.5 percent respectively. 17 
 
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis for the Rate of Indexing the Value of Pension Benefits 
   PVGP  PVEC  PVEP  PVT  PVPP  PVT/GDP 
4.61%  794,433,958  7,031,334,788  6,510,652,488  14,336,421,234  628,790  540% 
4.00%  794,433,958  6,245,342,029  5,859,131,853  12,898,907,840  565,742  486% 
3.00%  794,433,958  5,228,389,101  5,015,280,065  11,038,103,124  484,127  416% 
2.00%  794,433,958  4,399,409,904  4,319,310,135  9,513,153,997  417,244  358% 
1.00%  794,433,958  3,740,900,656  3,761,719,563  8,297,054,178  363,906  312% 
0.00%  794,433,958  3,215,410,429  3,313,147,053  7,322,991,440  321,184  276% 
-1.00%  794,433,958  2,779,078,685  2,935,416,384  6,508,929,027  285,479  245% 
 
Our assumption in the base case is that the retirees‟ pensions will not be increased in real 
terms.  It  can  be  seen  from  the  table  above  that  the  present  value  of  the  deficit  reaches  a 
maximum value of 14.3 billion euros, or 540% of GDP, when the real growth rate of pension 
indexing is taken as 4.61%, the historical real growth rate of GDP. In fact this is close to the real 
rate of indexation of civil servant pension benefits until 2008. The present value of the deficit has 
a minimum value of 6.5 billion euros, or 245% of GDP, when the real growth rate of pension 
indexing is taken as a minus 1%, that is; a cut in real pension benefits over time
10.  
It is clear from the results above  that an increase in the real growth rates of wages for 
working civil servants and pensions for retirees amplifies the deficit, while decreasing the growth 
in real wages  and pension benefits  produces an opposite  effect. However, in every case the 
burden of the costs as compared to the annual GDP is enormous   considering that we are 
discussing only one part of the  publicly sponsored pension system in North C yprus since the 
issue of the deficit of the social security system applicable to private sector employees is beyond 
the scope of the present paper.  
A more immediate measure of the fiscal burden of the public sector pension deficit than 
its present values  is the  ratio of the annual deficit  of the system to  annual public sector tax 
                                                             
10 Changing the rate of indexing again alters two adjustments discussed above. For rates of pension indexing 
of 4.61, 4.0, 3.0, 2.0, 1.0, 0.0 and -1 percent, the adjustment of 2% remains constant for the effect of deaths 
prior  to  retirement.  However,  the  adjustments  to  the  costs  of the  system  due  to  the  rate  of indexing  of 
pension after retirement are upward adjustment of 4.0, 2.0, 0.0, and a downward adjustment of 2.0, 3.5 ,4.5 
and 5.5 percent, respectively. 
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revenues. Also a measure of the macroeconomic burden of these pension deficits is their ratio on 
an annual basis to the corresponding year‟s GDP.  
As the civil service pensions plans are pay as you go systems the assumptions on how the 
size of the civil service will change over time is a critical variable in determining their fiscal 
burden. At the present time the employees of the public service number 11,000, which is a large 
number for a country with a population of only about 250,000 people. It is the current policy of 
the government to slow the grown of public sector employment, hence in these estimations we 
assume that each person is replaced when they retire. In addition is assumed the overall size of 
the public service employment will grow by one percent a year overall to correspond to the 
expected growth in population. Although these budgetary systems are no longer accepting new 
members, the significant deficit of these plans will continue to be a burden on future taxpayers‟ 
shoulders and on the whole economy
11. At the same time the pension plan contributions of the 
civil servants hired after 2008  to their new pension plan  will help finance this PAYGO system 
overtime. 
We are fortunate to have data   on all the new hires since 2008 , including  their  job 
classification, sex, salary, and age.  The average age of the new recruits is 25 years with 56 % 
being males and 44% being females. New recruits entering the civil service after 2010 are given 
salaries that are significantly lower (about 35%) than the salary scales in 2009 (Salary Law 
2009).  The wages used to project future wage rates are these reduced salaries. 
Table 8 below shows the fiscal impact over time expressed as ratios of tax revenues and 
GDP North Cyprus. 
Table 8: Annual Pension Deficit (APD) / Tax Revenue & Annual Pension Deficit / GDP 
   APD / TAX REVENUE  APD / GDP 
   Without New Entrants  With New Entrants  Without New Entrants  With New Entrants 
2010  27.62%  27.48%  6.92%  6.88% 
2015  25.70%  25.08%  6.44%  6.29% 
2020  25.29%  24.05%  6.34%  6.03% 
2025  24.67%  22.74%  6.18%  5.70% 
2030  22.09%  19.59%  5.53%  4.91% 
                                                             
11 The analysis of this new pension plan in terms of the adequacy of its funding rules is the subject of another paper. 
However, as it affects new employees only, during a time when there are promises to reduce the size of the civil 
service, it will unlikely make a significant contribution in the near future to the funding of the annual cost of the 
historical pension liabilities. 19 
 
2035  17.82%  14.86%  4.46%  3.72% 
2040  12.47%  9.31%  3.12%  2.33% 
2045  8.86%  5.68%  2.22%  1.42% 
 
In the base case scenario, using the annual real historical annual growth rates for both 
government tax revenues and the GDP of 4.61%, it is estimated that the ratios of the total annual 
deficit of the civil service pension system to annual tax revenues and the GDP are about 27% and 
6.9% respectively. They gradually decrease through time to about 15 % of tax revenue or 3.72% 
of GDP by 2035.  However, the decrease is very slow, and these ratios approach 5.68% and 
1.42% respectively only by 2045. It is important to remember that the average corresponding 
ratios for total spending on civil service pensions were 5% and 1.2% for the OECD countries in 
2006 (Palacios and Whitehouse, 2006). Hence, it will take North Cyprus approximately 34 years 
from now before the annual burden of the extraordinarily generous pension rights given over the 
past 37 years to public servants in North Cyprus will be brought into approximately the same 
relationship to GDP as is the current situation in Europe. Even at these similar long term ratios, 
several countries, such as Greece and France, consider that their pension system is in a state of 
crisis.   
 
7 Simulating Alternative Policy Measures 
Under  the  present  rules  of  the  grandfathering  civil  servant  pension  benefits  for  all 
existing members, only three variables can affect the future budgetary burden of these pension 
systems  and  hence  alter  the  relative  sizes  of  their  final  annual  and  present  value  liabilities 
compared to GDP and tax revenues. 
First, how will the pension benefits be indexed in the future? Will they be indexed only 
for inflation hence preserving the real value set at the time of retirement? Alternatively, will they 
be set at the rate of growth of real wages? Second, what rate of growth of GDP should be 
assumed in conducting these projections? The relative burden of these pension obligations are 
affected by the rate of real growth of GDP as tax revenues will tend to grow parallel to real GDP 
growth rate. The rate of growth of real GDP in turn will be a function of the growth of real 
wages (productivity change), the growth in the labor force (population change) and the growth in 
country‟s capital stock. Third, what will be the rate of growth of real wages that will determine 20 
 
the defined benefit retirement payments received at retirement and beyond? Hence, we carry out 
a sensitivity analysis of the impact on the relative fiscal burden with alternative assumptions 
about the behavior of these three variables over time.   
We begin by assuming that the economy in the future will grow at a real rate of 4.61% 
which is the average historical rate over the past 32 years. Looking toward the future the two 
parameters  that  may  vary  are  the  growth  rate  of  real  wages  for  those  still  working  (and 
determining  the  size  of  the  gratuity  payment  and  base  year  retirement  benefit)  and  the  real 
growth in the annual pension benefit after retirement.  
In the base case scenario, as stated earlier, the growth rate of pension benefits are indexed 
only for inflation and the real wage growth rate is assumed to be 2% plus the seniority increases 
of 1.75% for men and 2.00% for women. This analysis is carried out until 2045, the first year 
that the new recruits to the new system are expected to retire. 
Estimates are now made of the annual burden when pension benefits are indexed to real 
growth rate of wages. Figure 1 below shows the movements of the annual pension deficit as 
compared  to  GDP  in  both  the  base  case  scenario  with  no  indexation  and  in  the  alternative 
scenario with indexation. 
Although the two scenarios illustrate a similar trend in the annual deficit/GDP ratio over 
time, it can be clearly seen that the burden is more significant for the case where the real value of 
pension benefits are increased at the rate of 2% through time.  
 
Figure 1: Annual Pension Deficit / Annual GDP Ratios  
(Pension benefits indexed to the rate of inflation when the GDP growth rate is 4.61%) 21 
 
 
The present value of the additional budgetary outlays between the two cases is about 1.6 
billion euros in 2009 values
12. The present value of these additional payment amounts is equal to 
60% of the annual GDP of North Cyprus.      
The importance of the economic problem that these pension promises are creating is seen 
in Table 9. Whether indexed or not, it is certain that the pension benefit payments are a heavy 
burden on the economy. Pension payments to this group of citizens are eating up on a net of 
contribution basis between 5.7% and 6.9% of GDP for the next 15 years. Until 2045, the ratio is 
much higher than the OECD average. The gradual fall in the figures is primarily due to the 
decrease in the number of pensioners as they die and are replaced by new entrants who are 
earning significantly smaller salaries.  The GDP that is used to finance pensions and hence 
consumption of the retired civil servants will not be able to finance investments by local 
residents to enhance growth of the economy. In such a case, economic growth will only be 
achieved by increasing foreign investment and hence, foreign ownership of the economy. In the 
political context of North Cyprus, this is a highly contentious issue.  
 
Table 9:  Annual Pension Deficit / Annual GDP Ratios 
 
2012  2015  2020  2025  2035  2045 
gw:2%+age premium,gp:0%  6.66%  6.29%  6.03%  5.70%  3.72%  1.42% 
                                                             
12 In the case that wages grew by 3% and pension benefits were also indexed to real wages at 3%, then the additional 
cost in present value terms would be about 2.2 billion euros. 
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gw:2%+age premium,gp:2%  7.06%  7.02%  7.19%  7.11%  5.06%  2.41% 
 
Suppose if instead of 4.61% the real growth rate of GDP for North Cyprus were to slow 
to 3%, while wages continued to grow at a real rate of 2% (Figure 2). Then, when pension 
benefits were only indexed to inflation, the members of these pension plans would receive more 
than 6.27% of GDP until 2025 (Table 10, row 3). If they were indexed to the growth rate of real 
wages, they could be consuming more than 7.7% of GDP until year 2025. This is shown in 
Figure 2 and the accompanying table (Table 10, row 6). 
Figure 2: Annual Pension Deficit / Annual GDP Ratios 




The situation is much worse if the real growth rate of GDP were to fall to 2% a year. In 
this  case  the  historical  pension  commitments  to  those  retired  and  currently  employed  civil 
servants  would absorb over 9% of GDP until 2025 and still over 7% by 2035. Even if the 
pensions were only indexed to the rate of inflation, our estimates show that the civil servants will 




Table 10: Annual Pension Deficit / Annual GDP Ratios 
   2012  2015  2020  2025  2035  2045 
gw:2%+age premium,GDP:4.61% gp:0%  6.66%  6.29%  6.03%  5.70%  3.72%  1.42% 23 
 
gw:2%+age premium,GDP:3%,gp:0%  6.97%  6.90%  7.15%  7.30%  5.57%  2.49% 
gw:2%+age premium,GDP:2%,gp:0%  7.18%  7.31%  7.96%  8.54%  7.18%  3.54% 
gw:2%+age premium,GDP:4.61%,gp:2%  7.06%  7.02%  7.19%  7.11%  5.06%  2.41% 
gw:2%+age premium,GDP:3%,gp:2%  7.39%  7.70%  8.53%  9.11%  7.58%  4.21% 
gw:2%+age premium,GDP:2%,gp:2%  7.61%  8.17%  9.49%  10.65%  9.77%  5.98% 
 
8 Impact of Civil Service Pension Payments on the Public Sector Budget in Future Years 
When examining the impact of these past pension promises on the public sector budget, we 
assume that the tax revenues are a function of GDP and tax policies will be in place that will 
allow the ratio of tax revenues to GDP to remain constant over time. We also assume that the 
real growth rate of GDP will be sustained at its historical rapid real growth rate of 4.61% per 
annum. Furthermore, indexation of future pension benefits to the rate of inflation is also among 
our assumptions (Figure 3 and Table 11). 
Figure 3: Annual Pension Deficit / Annual Tax Revenue Ratios  




According to the estimations for 2012, with the indexation of pensions only to inflation 
(current stated policy of government), the share of current tax revenues that would be paid out as 
pension benefits would be 26.83%. If the pension had been indexed to the real growth in wages 
(the historical practice), then the share of tax revenues to be paid to civil service pensioners 
would have been 28.42%. 24 
 
    This share of the budget is quite close to the total expenditure made on primary and 
secondary education in the country (30.37% of tax revenues) and far above the total expenditure 
made on health care/tax revenues ratio of 14.84% (State Planning Organization, 2010). From 
Table 11 below, one can see the critical importance that the method of indexation of pension 
benefits has on determining the future burden of these pension payments on the public sector 
budget. By 2025, with indexation for only the rate of inflation, these payments will still account 
for about 19.5% of total government tax revenues. 
Table 11: Annual Pension Deficit /Annual Tax Revenue Ratios 
 
2012  2015  2020  2025  2035  2045 
gw:2%+age premium,gp:0%  26.56%  25.08%  24.05%  22.74%  14.86%  5.19% 
gw:2%+age premium,gp:2%  28.16%  28.01%  28.69%  28.38%  20.21%  9.61% 
 
On the contrary, if indexation is made according to the growth in real wages of 2%, the 
burden will be about 24% which is equal to an increase in the overall fiscal burden of about 23%. 
 
9 Conclusions 
Our estimations of the unfunded liabilities of the civil service pension systems in North Cyprus 
reveal  that  the  existing  problem  is  not  likely  to  be  solved  by  the  type  of  traditional  policy 
measures that have been implemented elsewhere in Europe. Various policy implications such as 
increasing the retirement age, decreasing the basic replacement rate, freezing the real wages and 
indexing pension benefits to only inflation resulted in only modest improvements in the fiscal 
burden to be borne over a long period of time.  
  Overcoming  this  problem  requires  more  fundamental  measures.  The  collapse  of  the 
former Soviet Union and governments of Eastern Europe in the 1990‟s provide many examples 
of  this  kind  of  a  solution  to  unfunded  pension  promises.  Although  labor  relations  in  North 
Cyprus are dominated by strong unions, it is conceivable that current pensioners and contributors 
to these pension plans may also be forced to receive fewer benefits by the government breaking 
its pension promises. However, given that any political solution on the island is likely to require 
an approval by both sides through a referendum, it is unlikely that any proposal would be agreed 
to by the residents of North Cyprus if it meant that a significant proportion of the population will 
suffer drastic losses of future pension benefits. Ultimately, it would appear that outside financial 25 
 
support will be necessary to get over this fiscal burden before any political solution on the island 
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2010  2012  2015  2020  2025  2035  2045 
994,223  2,394,003  5,403,978  13,579,482  26,368,299  63,510,550  107,040,066 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 